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A Signaling Theory of Education under 
the Presence of Career Concerns 
By SUNJOO HWANG* 
A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a 
student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of 
education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of 
education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a 
sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market 
problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting 
device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work 
incentives generated by career concerns. 
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   I. Introduction 
 
ife consists of two important stages. In the first stage, as students, people 
decide how much education to obtain. In the second stage, as workers, they 
choose jobs and exert effort in the workplace (and then they retire). Therefore, 
education and careers are two important choices people make in life. However, 
people do not choose education and careers independently. They choose education 
while anticipating its impact on their future careers. However, the existing 
literature rarely considers possible interactions between education and careers. The 
standard model of (stand-alone) education is the job market signaling model of 
Spence (1973), in which education is used to signal workers’ hidden productivity to 
the labor market. The standard model of (stand-alone) careers is the career 
concerns model of Holmstrom (1999), in which workers exert efforts to achieve 
good performance, which signals to the labor market that they are talented workers. 
Although the education and career concerns literatures starting from the two 
aforementioned seminal papers are both vast, little work has been done on the 
interactions between education and career concerns.  
This paper examines an integrated model of education and career concerns. By 
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explicitly considering the interactions between education and career concerns, I 
find new welfare implications of education: if society uses education to sort agents 
according to productivity, then education could reduce the total surplus. This is 
inconsistent with Spence’s standard job market signaling model, which implies that 
education as a sorting device enhances welfare (even if it has no human capital 
value). Suppose that there are high type and low type agents. The labor market 
treats them equally, as they are indistinguishable. In such a case, high type agents 
leave and only low type agents prevail in the labor market (with an appropriate 
assumption on reservation payoffs). This loss of top talent (i.e., the lemon market 
problem) can be resolved if education reveals hidden types. 
This story of the lemon market problem, however, may be overturned if not 
merely hidden productivity (type) but also hidden effort can contribute to output. 
Suppose that there exists a post-education work stage, in which an agent exerts 
effort to produce output. If the labor market does not fully know the agent’s hidden 
productivity, she works diligently to demonstrate her talent. However, if education 
reveals the hidden talent, she is demotivated, exerts little effort, and hence output 
decreases. Therefore, education as a sorting device could be detrimental to welfare. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an integrated model of 
education and career concerns. Section III analyzes the welfare implications of 
education. Section IV discusses an important technical issue in the integrated 
model. Spence’s standard model has a unique separating equilibrium and no 
pooling equilibrium if one uses the Intuitive Criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps 
(1987), a standard equilibrium refinement. If the integrated model also has no 
pooling equilibrium, this paper’s main welfare implication has of little value. In 
Section IV, I argue that pooling equilibria could survive the Intuitive Criterion in 
the integrated model. Section 5 presents the conclusion. 
 
II. The Model 
 
An agent’s hidden productivity   is either h (high) or l  (low) where 
0 l h 1.    There are many agents whose total measure is normalized to one. 
One half is of high type and the other half is of low type. 
The timeline is as follows. There are three periods t 0, 1, 2.  At t 0,  each 
agent as a student chooses a publicly-observable education level [ )e 0,    at the 
cost of education ( )C , e  such that ( ) eC , 0 0, C 0, C 0,     and eC 0,   
where the lower subscript denotes the (cross-) partial derivatives. At t 1, 2,  the 
competitive labor market pays wage tw ; Given tw , each agent as a worker 
chooses privately-observable effort level [ ]ta 0, a  at the cost of effort  tc a  
such that    c 0 c' 0 0, c' 0,    and ;c'' 0  Given ta ,  a publicly-observable 
output  ty 0, 1  is realized. 
Effort and productivity contribute to output in the following manner: let 
 tf , a  be the conditional probability of success 
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(1)       t t t tf , a y 1 , a ka , k 0|         
 
Note that the probability of success increases with effort and productivity. (The 
following analysis holds even if  tf , a  has a general functional form such that 
af 0  and ) f .0   To ensure that  tf , a 1   for any  ta ,0, a  it is 
necessary to assume that a 1 h.   Given that  ty 0, 1 ,  one can interpret 
( )tf , a  as the expected output conditional on  t, a .  
I assume that the labor market is competitive, and hence wage tw  equals the 
market’s expectation of output. I assume that output ty  is not contractible. 
Given a wage structure, a type   agent’s preference is represented by 
 
(2)            1 1 2 2C , e w c w| c a|a            
 
where    0, 1  is the discount factor and  |    denotes the type   agent’s 
expectation with respect to the relevant information structure. 
Below, I consider two cases. First, high type agents choose a higher level of 
education than low type agents—separating equilibrium. Second, both types 
choose the same level of education—pooling equilibrium. 
 
A. Separating Equilibrium 
 
Note that education has no human capital value. It can only signal hidden 
productivity. Thus, the most reasonable case is one in which low type agents 
choose zero education while high type agents choose the minimum level of 
education, which the low type agents cannot mimic because of higher cost of 
education. This separating equilibrium is known as the Riley equilibrium. I confine 
my attention to the Riley equilibrium, which is later shown to be the only 
separating equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion suggested by Cho and 
Kreps (1987). 
In the Riley equilibrium, types are revealed, as is the expected output. Suppose 
the market expects that  eta   will be chosen in equilibrium. A type   agent’s 
wage is then, for , ,t 1 2   
 
     e et t t w f , a ka       
 
That is, the wage is fixed and independent of effort ta  (though it depends on 
 eta  ). Let  *ta   denote the equilibrium effort type   agent actually chooses. 
Because effort is costly and has no effect on wages, it follows that 
   * et ta a 0    in rational expectations equilibria. 
Let  e   be the equilibrium level of education, which the type   agent 
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chooses. Thus,      e l 0 and e h 0.   Note that  e h  represents the minimum 
education level low type agents cannot profitably mimic. That is,  e h  is 
characterized by 
 
(3)             (h 1 C l, e h l 1 C l, e l 0)        
 
Let u  denote the type   agent’s reservation payoff, which she can obtain by 
leaving the labor market. This is perhaps the payoff of self-production or of 
participating in an alternative labor market. I assume that lu 0  for simplicity 
and that 
Assumption 1 h1 h u h
2
    
Assumption 1 implies that the lemon market problem exists: high type agents will 
not participate unless the types are revealed, despite the fact that their participation 
is socially efficient. I also assume that education is not prohibitively costly for the 
high type (though it is highly costly for the low type): 
 
Assumption 2      h1 h u C h, e h       
(3) implies that Assumption 2 holds if the education cost decreases sufficiently 
with productivity. Assumption 2 implies that the high type willingly participates in 
the labor market by undertaking costly education, as the hidden type is reveled, and 
therefore, a higher wage is promised. 
  
The total surplus in this Riley separating equilibrium is given by 
 
(4)     ( )1 1 h C h, e h
2
    
 
as the low type agent’s utility equals zero regardless of whether or not they 
participate. 
As for a benchmark case, suppose that education cannot be used as a sorting 
device. Due to the lemon market problem, the total surplus is then given by 
 
(5)   h1 1 u2   
 
Assumption 2 and equations (4) and (5) imply that education as a sorting device 
mitigates the lemon market problem by inducing high type agents’ participation in 
the labor market. Furthermore, education as a sorting device improves efficiency in 
the Paretian sense, as low type agents’ payoffs are unchanged while high type 
agents’ payoffs increase. 
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B. Pooling Equilibrium 
 
In a pooling equilibrium, education has no sorting effect, and hence, the labor 
market cannot distinguish types. Given that education has no role but is only costly, 
I confine my attention to the most efficient pooling equilibrium, in which both type 
agents choose zero education. In Spence’s standard job market signaling model, 
where interactions between education and career concerns are ignored, this pooling 
equilibrium fails to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Later, I shall discuss that this is 
not the case if one considers the interactions between education and career 
concerns. 
 Suppose that the market expects that  eta   is chosen in equilibrium. Let eta
denote      e et ta h , a l  and m  denote the market’s expectation conditional on 
e
t .a  Then, wages are given by 
  
(6)  m1 1w y    
 
(7)    m2 1 2 1w y y y|    
  
Importantly, the date-2 wage (i.e., the expected date-2 output) depends on the date-
1 output 1y . This is because market observes the date-1 performance 1y , which 
is informative of an agent’s hidden productivity  , which determines the date-2 
performance 2y . (In a separating equilibrium, in contrast, the date-1 performance 
has no value of information, as the hidden productivity is already unraveled). This 
observation is crucial in this paper. Even if there are no explicit incentive contracts, 
agents face date-1 incentives because the date-1 effort (stochastically) determines 
the date-1 output, which determines the date-2 wage. However, the date-1 wage is 
fixed and independent of output, as no output is realized in the beginning of date-1. 
To observe this formally, note that at date-2, a type θ agent maximizes 
   2 1 2w y c a .  Since  2 1w y  is independent of 2a  (while it depends on 
( )e2a  ), the agent chooses ( )*2a 0   for h, l.   Then, in rational expectations 
equilibria, it follows that   ( )e2 2a a 0.    At date-1, the agent chooses 
,*1 1a a ( )  which maximizes 
 
(8)        1 1 2 1 1 2w c a w y a c a|        
 
where   is the type   agent’s expectation conditional on   and eta . Since 
1a  affects the probability of 1y , ( )
*
1 1a a  , is characterized by the following 
first-order condition 
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(9) 
 
      
     
( )
( )
: the marginal incentive
11 2 1
1
1 2 1 2
1
a 1 2 2
c a w y | a
a
f , a w 1 1 f , a w 0
a






    
     




In general, ( )*1a   depends on  , as ( )a 1f , a  depends on  . Given the 
simplification that   , t tf , a ka    however, ( )*1a   is independent of  , 
though the main result of this paper is robust to the functional form of   tf , a
under certain regularity conditions.1 Thus, I let ( )* *1 1a a   and ( )e e1 1a a  . One 
may expect that the wage wedge  ( ) ( )2 2w 1 w 0  is positive. This is true because 
better date-1 performance implies that hidden productivity is greater, indicating 
that the expected date-2 performance would be greater. The following lemma 
provides a formal account. 
 
Lemma 1 The marginal incentive in (9) is positive, independent of  , and equal to 
 











where mARV  is the market’s assessed variance conditional on et .a  
 
Proof: First of all, the marginal incentive is positive since the variances are always 
nonnegative and ?  is a nondegenerate random variable from the market’s 
perspective. Independence with respect to ? is obvious. Next, I shall prove that 
   2 2w 1 w 0    equals the ratio of variances. Initially, the wage is given by 
 
(11) 
     
    
   
(the iterated expectation)
= { ( )}
m m m
2 1 2 1 2 1 1
m e e
2 2 1
e m e m
2 1 2 1
h 0
w y y | y y |θ, y | y
, a , a y
f h, a ( h | y ) f l , a 1
1
h











    
 
 
1 Assume a set of regularity conditions: , ,af 0 f 0   and af  0   for any ( ),, a  where the 
subscripts denote (cross) partial derivatives. In this case, it can be shown that ) ( )(1 1* * 0ha la   Although the 
equilibrium effort depends on type, it is unobservable by the market. Thus, under the absence of education as a 
sorting device, the market cannot identify the high type from the low type, and hence, the agent has work 
incentives. I thank an anonymous referee for having pointed out to me the necessity of certain regularity 
conditions. 
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where ( )m 1h | y  is the market’s posterior of  h   given 1y  and et .a  This 
posterior is given by 
 







1 f h, a













1 1 f h, a
2( h | y 0 )
1 11 f h, a 1 f l , a
2 2
            
  
 
Then, it follows 
 




e e e e
1 1 1 1
1 f h, a f h, a f l , a
4w 1 w 0
1 1f h, a f l , a 1 f h, a f l , a
2 2
            
  
 
Note that the numerator equals ,21 h
4
which equals ( )mARV   since 
 
   m m 222 2 2mAR 1 1 1V h h h
2 4 4
           
 
The denominator equals  m 1ARV y  since 
 
   
     ( ) since impli{ } es
m 2m 2 m
1 1





y 1 y y 0
y






   
 
 
where         ( , )m m m m e e1 1 e1 1 11| ay y f h,a f l ,a2f             . ■ 
 
Lemma 1 implies that the date-1 marginal incentive is determined by the signal-
to-noise ratio—the extent to which the data 1y  conveys information about a 
hidden variable .  Holmstrom (1999) finds the same result under a simpler model 
in which neither the market nor the agent knows the hidden type. Thus, making   
private information does not affect the size of the career concerns motive of work 
incentives under the current specification, in which the expected output is linear in 
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 and t a (i.e.  t tf , a ka   ). In a more general specification, work 
incentives depend on .  
A key observation from (10) is as follows. If an agent’s hidden ability is not 
revealed to the labor market, the agent faces date-1 work incentives in order to 
convince the market that she is of high ability. 
The next lemma demonstrates the existence of a rational expectations 
equilibrium  * et ta a . Note that  2 1w y  depends on e1a .  To highlight this 
dependence, I write     e2 1 2 1 1w y w y a .  
Lemma 2 Suppose 1 hc' h k
k




     such that 
 
        *2 1 2 1 1 1 1k w 1 w 0 c' at aˆ ˆ ˆ ˆa a a a       
 
Proof: Let        e e e1 2 1 2 1v a w 1 a w 0 a 0.    In addition, let    c'g k   . 
Then, (*) there exists a unique 1
1 ha 0,
k
     for each given 
e
1a  such that 
   e1 1g a v a since   ,c' 0 0 ,1 hc' h kk      and  e1h v a . Then, 
  1 e1 1a g v a . Let     1 ee1 1a g v a .    e1a  is a continuous function on 
the closed interval 1 h0,
k
     to the same interval. Then, the Brouwer fixed point 
theorem and (* ) imply that there exists an *1
1 ha 0,
k
     such that ( )
* *
1 1a a .  
That is, there exists a rational expectations equilibrium *1a .■ 
 
Given the equilibrium effort ,1a
*  the date-1 wage equals 
 
      =m m m m * *1 1 1 1 1| 1w y y f , a h ka2               
Additionally, according to (11), a type   agent’s expectation of the date-2 wage 
equals 
 
   m2 1 1w y h h | y           
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Subsequently, a type   agent’s payoff equals 
 
(13)      * * mP 1 1 11U h ka c a h h| y2            
Note that this payoff increases with the level of equilibrium effort *1a  since (9) 
implies that *1a  is lower than the first-best effort, which maximizes  ka c a . 
Thus, if there are two equilibrium efforts, a'  and a'' such that ,a' a''  then 
every agent is strictly better off with a''  than a' .  Therefore, the remaining part 
of this paper focuses on the maximum (or the supremum) of equilibrium efforts 
based on the notion of the Pareto optimality. 
Note that low type agents will always participate in the labor market, as their 
reservation payoff lu  is zero. However, high type agents will participate if and 
only if 
 
Assumption 3      h m h1 1 11 h ka c a h h | y 1 u2        * *  
 
To observe when high type agents profitably participate, suppose for the moment 
,k 0  and hence, 1a 0*  by (10). Note that    m 1h| y 0, 1     is the type 
  agent’s expectation of the market’s posterior given 1y . High type agents are 
more optimistic about the future than low type agents, as they know their superior 
ability:    l m h m1 11h | y h | y .2           This is related to the market’s 
learning effect. The labor market updates its expectation of date-2 output by 
observing the date-1 output. High type agents then expect more income, as the 
date-1 output is (stochastically) higher. If the learning effect is slight (i.e., 
 h m 1 1h | y 2      has a small value), Assumption 1 implies that Assumption 3 
is violated. If instead the learning effect is large enough, Assumption 3 is satisfied. 
Even if the learning effect is slight, if k 0  and the surplus ( )* *1 1ka c a  
generated by career concerns is large enough, then Assumption 3 is satisfied. 
As long as high type agents find it optimal to participate (i.e. Assumption 3 
holds), the total surplus in this pooling equilibrium is     ,P P1 U h U l2     which 
equals 
 
(14)    * *1 11 1 h ka c a2      
according to the martingale property, that is, the expectation of the posterior equals 
its prior. 
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III. Welfare Implications 
 
By comparing (14) to (4), it is apparent that the total surplus in the pooling 
equilibrium is greater than that in the Riley separating equilibrium. That is, the use 
of education as a sorting device reduces the total surplus. There are two reasons. 
First, education as a signaling device reveals hidden productivity. Thus, agents 
need not persuade their ability to potential employers in the labor market, which 
means that their post-education work incentives (motivated by career concerns) are 
eliminated. In consequence, the work stage surplus  * *1 1ka c a  is not realized. 
Second, education is wasteful and incurs cost   C h, e h . 
The detrimental effect of education as a sorting device hinges on Assumption 3. 
If this assumption is not satisfied, only low type agents participate in the labor 
market. Expecting this fact rationally, the market then pays zero to the participants. 
Thus, the total surplus in the pooling equilibrium equals 
 




Thus, we return to the standard result, where the use of education as a signaling 
device improves the total surplus. One might wonder when Assumption 3 is more 
likely to be satisfied. This depends on h  and hu .  The degree of the lemon 
market problem can be measured by h| h u | since adverse selection discourages 
the participation of high type agents in the labor market. Note that Assumption 3 
holds if h  is large or hu  is small, as in this case high type agents will participate 
even if the work stage surplus is relatively low. Thus, Assumption 3 is satisfied if 
the degree of the lemon market problem is severe, which is of high interest, 
whereas it is violated if the lemon market problem is not very important, which is 
of little interest. In the standard Spence model in which the post-education work 
stage is ignored, education as a sorting device is more beneficial if the lemon 
market problem is more severe. However, in this very case, education as a sorting 
device is more detrimental if the post-education work stage is explicitly considered. 
Summarizing the analysis brings the following main result: 
 
Proposition 1 Suppose that the lemon market problem exists (i.e., Assumption 1) 
and that education is not prohibitively costly (i.e., Assumption 2). Then, 
(i) If there is no post-education work stage, the use of education as a sorting device 
increases the total surplus. 
 
Suppose for the following that there is a post-education work stage. 
 
(ii) If high type agents profitably participate in the labor market in the most 
efficient pooling equilibrium (i.e. Assumption 3), which is the case when the lemon 
market problem is severe, then education as a sorting device decreases the total 
surplus. 
(iii) If high type agents cannot profitably participate in the most efficient pooling 
equilibrium (i.e. Assumption 3 is violated), which is the case when the lemon 
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market problem is unimportant, then education as a sorting device increases the 
total surplus. 
 
In the following, I consider three extensions. In the first extension, I consider 
multiple types. Productivity is determined by various hidden factors. For instance, 
intelligence and fitness-to-work are two important factors that contribute to overall 
productivity. Let 1  denote intelligence, which agents observe but the market 
does not. The marginal cost of education  e 1C , e  decreases in 1 . Let 2  
denote fitness-to-work, which is unobservable to agents and the market. Let 
 1 2g ,    be productivity, where g  increases in each argument. In this case, 
education can reveal only 1 . Lemma 1 then implies that an agent’s post-education 













   
 














That is, the marginal incentive is greater under pooling equilibria. This result holds 
irrespective of whether or not 1  and 2  are independent. That is, the more 
information education reveals, the more likely it will be detrimental to welfare. 
In the second extension, I assume that education has both a human capital-
enhancing effect and a sorting effect. This situation can be modeled in the 
following way: the overall productivity '  equals ,e   where 0.   In this 
case, the welfare implication of education is ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
improves efficiency by raising productivity. On the other hand, it reduces 
efficiency by discouraging post-education work incentives. 
In the third extension, explicit incentive contracts are considered. Thus far, I 
have assumed that workers face only the implicit incentive generated by career 
concerns but not an explicit incentive provided by a performance-based contract. 
Suppose instead that output ?? is contractible at no cost. Then, the linear contract   ,t t tw y y K   where K  is a constant, induces the first-best effort since the 
agent becomes a residual claimant. However, such a ‘perfect’ contractibility is not 
satisfied in many real-life principal-agent relationships. Performance measures of 
workers in administration offices are often nonverifiable. Subjective and hence 
non-contractible performance measures (such as quality) often contain more 
information than objective performance measures (such as quantity). For these 
reasons, suppose that t y  is non-contractible. Let tp  be a contractible but 
imperfect performance measure. Workers then face an imperfect explicit incentive 
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generated by a contract  t tw p .  The implicit incentive generated by career 
concerns could then complement the imperfect explicit incentive. Therefore, 
education as a sorting device could reduce the welfare to an extent, which increases 
in the imperfectness of tp . 
Proposition 1 implies that uncertainty in types is beneficial for social welfare. 
This seems at odd at a first glance, as one might expect that the uncertainty, as a 
source of market failure, reduces social welfare. However, this is consistent with 
the general theory of second-best suggested by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956): if 
there is an existing source of market failure (so that the economy is in a second-
best outcome), an additional source of market failure could either increase or 
decrease social welfare (see Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kim (2004) for other 
examples of the general theory.) However, Proposition 1 is not a simple corollary 
of the general theory. In fact, the general theory is too general to explain why an 
additional source of market failure is socially beneficial; the general theory only 
raises the possibility that an additional market failure is beneficial. 
Proposition 1 is also related to the information disclosure literature. In a dynamic 
tournament setting, Ederer (2010) shows that disclosing interim performance can 
reduce incentives due to the trade-off between evaluation and motivation effects. In 
the presence of career concerns and relational contracting, Mukherjee (2008) 
shows that if the current employer discloses workers’ performance levels to the 
labor market, the career concerns motive of incentives increases, whereas the 
effectiveness of relational contracting is reduced. Proposition 1 is, however, 
different from these papers in that (1) it examines the effect of disclosing types 
rather than performance on incentives and (2) these papers consider only post-
education workplace behaviors, while the present study considers both education 
and post-education behaviors. 
 
IV. Intuitive Criterion 
 
There are infinitely many separating and pooling equilibria in the standard job 
market signaling model (where there is no post-education work stage). However, 
Cho and Kreps (1987) show that only the Riley separating equilibrium (and no 
pooling equilibria) satisfies their Intuitive Criterion, which currently is the standard 
equilibrium refinement criterion, and is hence reasonable. Recently, Alos-Ferrer 
and Prat (2012) show that certain pooling equilibria can satisfy the Intuitive 
Criterion if there is learning by the market (or employers). If there is a post-
education work stage, as in this paper, pooling equilibria are more likely consistent 
with the Intuitive Criterion. These points are elaborated below. 
 
A. Separating Equilibrium 
 
Consider initially the standard job market signaling model. Let  l he , e  be a 
non-Riley separating equilibrium such that le 0  and   ,he e h  where  e h  
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is given by (3). (Note that le  cannot be positive since otherwise low type agents 
profitably deviate to zero education). Then, if an agent chooses e'  such that, 
  he h e' ,e   the market should not believe that the agent is high type since 
otherwise high type agents profitably deviate to e' .  However, such a belief is not 
intuitive for the following reason. If low type agents deviate to e',  they are worse 
off even in the best scenario in which the market believes them as high type and 
hence pays h  rather than l . If high type agents deviate to e',  they are better off 
in the best scenario. That is, low type agents never deviate while high type agents 
may deviate. Thus, the market should believe that those who deviate to e'  are 
high type. Therefore, if only the intuitive belief is allowed, as required by the 
Intuitive Criterion,  l he , e  is no longer a separating equilibrium. Nothing 
changes in this argument even if one introduces a post-education work stage, as 
there is no uncertainty in types. 
 
B. Pooling Equilibrium 
 
Consider the standard job market signaling model. Let Pe  be a pooling 
equilibrium. Then, there is Pe
  such that 
 
        m P P1 C , e h 1 C , e          
 
It follows then l hP P Pe .e e   Suppose that Pe  is a pooling equilibrium. Then, the 
market should not believe that the agent who deviates to  l hP Pe e , e  is high type, 
since otherwise high type agents profitably deviate to e . But this belief is not 
intuitive. By deviating to e ,  low type agents are worse off even under the best 
scenario (i.e., the market believes them as high type), while high type agents are 
better off under the best scenario. Thus, only high type agents may deviate to e ,  
and hence, the market should believe that those who choose e  are high type. If 
only this type of intuitive belief is allowed, Pe  is no longer a pooling equilibrium. 
However, this is not the case if one adds post-education learning by the market 
(or employers). After the education choice, the output signal ty  is realized. (To 
focus on the learning effect, I assume for now that k 0  so that agents do not 
exert any work effort). By observing ,1y  the labor market learns (partially) about 
the hidden type and then adjusts its expectation of the date-2 output  m 1| y . 
High type agents know that their date-1 output will be (stochastically) greater than 
that of low type agents. Thus, even if types are not revealed in pooling equilibria, 
high type agents expect larger incomes (i.e.,    1h m l m 1| y | y           ). 
Then, a high type agent’s gain from separating himself (by gaining more education 
than Pe ) from low type agents is lower than it is when there is no post-education 
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learning. To see this, note that Pe
  is determined via 
 
         m m 1 P P| y C , e h 1 C , e              
 
If this learning effect (    1h m l m 1| y | y           ) is large enough, it follows 
that l hP Pe .e  Then, there is no education level e'  such that low type agents are 
worse off even under the best scenario while high type agents are better off under 
the best scenario. Thus, this pooling equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. 
(See Alos-Ferrer and Prat (2012) for more details). 
If one also considers post-education working (i.e., k 0 ), then the pooling 
equilibria become more robust with respect to the Intuitive Criterion. By separating 
himself from low type agents, high type agents lose the work stage surplus 
,* *1 1ka c( a )  which is realized only in pooling equilibria. If this surplus is large 
enough, high type agents are worse off by separating himself from low type agents 
(by taking more education than Pe ) even in the best scenario. That is, for any 
,Pe e  it follows that 
 
           m h m * *1 1 1 P| y ka c a C h, e h 1 C h, e               
 




I revisit Spence’s signaling theory of education by providing an integrated model 
of education and career concerns. Under the absence of post-education career 
concerns, education as a sorting device improves welfare by mitigating the lemon 
market problem. Under the presence of post-education career concerns, sorting by 
education could be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives 
generated by career concerns. 
Although this paper examines the welfare effects of education, one should be 
careful in drawing educational policy implications directly from the current paper, 
as the main result is based on several assumptions. Rather, the merit of this paper is 
that it provides a theoretic framework with which researchers may conduct thought 
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